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Summary
This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the agreement on civilian
nuclear cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by focusing on
congressional roles in crafting and carrying out the agreement.  Some Members have
been concerned about U.S. nuclear cooperation with China in the context of China’s
practices related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Members also have been
interested in how Congress reviewed the agreement with China as well as how this
experience might apply to other similar agreements, such as that with India.
Congress also exercises oversight of exchanges with China in the nuclear area
conducted by the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).  Some Members have considered whether financing by the
U.S. Export-Import Bank should support nuclear exports to China.
Key developments in the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement were timed
for diplomatic summits between U.S. Presidents and PRC leaders.  On April 30,
1984, President Reagan witnessed the initialing of the agreement.  Secretary of
Energy John Herrington signed the agreement on July 23, 1985.  On July 24, 1985,
President Reagan submitted to Congress the “Agreement Between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.”
Consideration of whether a Presidential certification would be the centerpiece of a
summit in 1997 advanced the agreement’s implementation.  President Clinton, on
January 12, 1998, signed certifications (as required by P.L. 99-183) on China’s
nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices to implement the agreement.  The
President also issued a certification and waived a sanction imposed after the 1989
Tiananmen Crackdown (as required by P.L. 101-246).  Congressional review ended
on March 18, 1998, and the agreement has since been implemented.
Almost 13 years passed between the time that President Reagan submitted the
agreement to Congress in July 1985 and its implementation in March 1998 under the
Clinton Administration.  Congress played an important role in determining
implementation of the agreement, including holding hearings, crafting legislation,
and requiring and reviewing Presidential certifications.  One of the primary
congressional actions was enacted in P.L. 99-183, the Joint Resolution Relating to
the Approval and Implementation of the Proposed Agreement for Nuclear
Cooperation Between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, which
required a Presidential certification and a report followed by a period of 30 days of
continuous session of Congress before the agreement could be implemented.  After
the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown, Congress enacted sanctions in P.L. 101-246, the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1990-1991, suspending nuclear
cooperation with China and requiring an additional Presidential certification on the
PRC’s nuclear non-proliferation assurances.
On February 28, 2005, Westinghouse (along with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries)
submitted a bid to sell four nuclear power reactors to China.  The Bush
Administration has supported this bid.
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Congressional Concerns
This CRS Report discusses the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the
United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was signed in 1985
and implemented in 1998.  The discussion focuses on congressional roles in crafting
and carrying out the agreement.  On July 24, 1985, President Reagan submitted to
Congress the “Agreement Between the United States and the People’s Republic of
China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.”  Some Members have been
concerned about U.S. nuclear cooperation with China in the context of China’s
practices related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  (See CRS Report RL31555,
China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy
Issues, by Shirley Kan.)  Members also have been interested in how Congress
reviewed the agreement with China as well as how this experience might apply to
other similar agreements, such as that with India.  Congress also exercises oversight
of exchanges with China in the nuclear area conducted by the Department of Energy
and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).  (On the creation of the
NNSA and issues related to China, see CRS Report RL30143, China: Suspected
Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets, by Shirley Kan.)
Some Members also have considered whether U.S. government resources
should be used to support nuclear exports to China, specifically by Westinghouse
Electric Company.  (For information on the Ex-Im Bank, see CRS Report 98-568,
Export-Import Bank: Background and Legislative Issues, by James Jackson.)  Critics
have argued that the United States, including its Export-Import Bank, should not
support nuclear exports to China, given proliferation concerns.1  On June 28, 2005,
Representative Bernard Sanders introduced Amendment 381 to the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for FY2006
(H.R. 3057) to prohibit funds from being used by the Export-Import Bank to approve
an application for a loan or loan guarantee for a nuclear project in the PRC.  The
House adopted the amendment (313-114) and passed H.R. 3057 on June 28, 2005,
with the language in Section 589.  The Senate’s version did not have similar
language, and the amendment was dropped in conference (H.Rept. 109-265).  H.R.
3057 was enacted as P.L. 109-102 on November 14, 2005. 
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Overview: Nuclear Cooperation with China and U.S.
National Interests
U.S. Interests
The question for U.S. policy-makers since the Reagan Administration in the
1980s has been whether nuclear cooperation with the PRC would be necessary to
advance U.S. diplomatic, security, and economic interests.  There were tensions in
the framework for bilateral relations that informed U.S. considerations of peaceful
nuclear cooperation.  While the PRC under the rule of the Communist Party of China
already possessed nuclear weapons, the PRC also has had a record of nuclear
proliferation to countries such as Pakistan and Iran.2  The United States and the PRC
have not been allies, but in 1970 President Nixon began rapprochement with
Communist Party ruler Mao Zedong and both countries considered areas of
cooperation during the Cold War until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Nuclear cooperation involves weighing risks and benefits.  The risks include nuclear
proliferation and upgrading technology and knowledge that also might have military
uses.  The benefits involve expanding engagement, building mutual confidence, and
enabling U.S. businesses to compete for potentially lucrative nuclear power contracts.
Increased nuclear power in China’s electricity generation also could have an impact
on its demand for oil and emission of greenhouse gas.
Nuclear Power Market
After PRC rulers led by Deng Xiaoping began to reform the economy in 1979,
China announced plans for purchasing foreign nuclear power reactors to provide
energy for economic modernization.  According to those initial plans, China desired
a total of 10,000 megawatts of nuclear power, or 5% of total electrical capacity by
2000.  The acquisitions were estimated to be worth $10-20 billion.3  However, by
1999, nuclear power accounted for about 1% of electricity generation in China.4 
In April 2004, Vice President Dick Cheney visited Beijing and discussed with
Politburo Standing Committee Member and PRC Vice President Zeng Qinghong
China’s plans to build 24 to 30 nuclear power reactors by 2020, at the cost of $1.5
billion for each plant.  Presumably, China would then draw 4-5% of its electricity
from nuclear power, expanded from 2% in 2003.5  On February 28, 2005,
Westinghouse (along with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) submitted a bid to sell four
nuclear power reactors to China, with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
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approval.6  The Bush Administration has supported Westinghouse’s bid to sell
nuclear reactors to China.7
Summits and Timeline
Key developments in the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement were timed
for diplomatic summits between U.S. Presidents and PRC leaders.  On April 30,
1984, President Reagan witnessed the initialing of the nuclear cooperation
agreement.  Secretary of Energy John Herrington signed the agreement on July 23,
1985.  On July 24, 1985, President Reagan submitted the agreement to Congress.
Consideration of whether a Presidential certification (as required by P.L. 99-183 on
China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices) would be the centerpiece of
a summit in 1997 advanced the agreement’s implementation.  President Clinton, on
January 12, 1998, signed certifications  to implement the agreement.  The President
also waived a sanction imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown (in P.L. 101-
246).  Congressional review ended on March 18, 1998, and the agreement has since
been implemented.
Almost 13 years passed between the time that President Reagan submitted the
agreement to Congress in July 1985 and its implementation in March 1998 under the
Clinton Administration.  Congress played an important role in determining
implementation of the agreement, including holding hearings, crafting legislation,
and requiring and reviewing Presidential certifications.  One of the primary
congressional actions was enacted in P.L. 99-183, the Joint Resolution Relating to
the Approval and Implementation of the Proposed Agreement for Nuclear
Cooperation Between the United States and the People’s Republic of China
(December 16, 1985), which required a Presidential certification and a report
followed by a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress before the
agreement could be implemented.  After the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown, Congress
enacted sanctions in P.L. 101-246, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs
1990-1991 (February 16, 1990),  suspending nuclear cooperation with China and
requiring an additional Presidential certification on the PRC’s nuclear non-
proliferation assurances.
Negotiation of the Agreement
Congressional Concerns in Early 1980s
In January 1983, U.S. officials negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement with
China linked possible U.S. nuclear exports to China with its reported nuclear
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proliferation practices, particularly in Pakistan.8  Before an agreement was finalized,
Senators Gordon Humphrey, William Roth, and William Proxmire wrote to Secretary
of State George Shultz in December 1983.  They urged that an agreement be drafted
so that none of the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 would be
waived.  They also wrote that the agreement should include explicit pledges by China
not to transfer any nuclear weapons equipment or information to any nation; to
support the U.S. requirement for recipients to accept the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)’s safeguards on  nuclear exports; and to enter into an agreement with
the IAEA to place China’s civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards with
terms identical to those of the U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement.  Reported concerns
about China also included its nuclear proliferation activities in Argentina and South
Africa.9
Reagan Visits China in 1984
U.S. Initials Agreement.  In preparation for President Ronald Reagan’s first
visit to the PRC in April 1984 to improve bilateral relations, officials sought an
agreement on civil nuclear cooperation as the “deliverable” that caught the most
attention.  Begun in 1981, negotiations intensified before the visit over the U.S.
requirement (under the Atomic Energy Act) for China to obtain U.S. prior approval
before reprocessing, enrichment, or other alteration of transferred nuclear material.
China objected to perceived infringement of its sovereignty.  At the end of his visit,
on April 30, 1984, Reagan witnessed the initialing of the nuclear cooperation
agreement.  The President said that he was “particularly proud” of the agreement,
saying that “it will open broad opportunities for joint work in development of the
energy base which China needs for her modernization.”  According to a summary of
the terms provided by officials to the New York Times, China agreed that it would not
enrich or reprocess fuel from U.S.-built reactors or store materials without U.S.
consent; and the United States agreed not to use its control rights to inhibit the
growth of China’s nuclear industry out of commercial rivalry.10
U.S. Points to PRC Nonproliferation Pledges.  China also took steps in
response to U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation during negotiations for the
agreement.  While China opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
China applied for membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in September 1983 and became a member on January 1, 1984.  (The PRC did not
accede to the NPT until March 9, 1992.  Also, China  joined the Zangger
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Committee11 in October 1997 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in May 2004.
Since 1992, the NSG has required “full-scope safeguards,” or IAEA inspections of
all other declared nuclear facilities in addition to the facility importing supplies to
prevent diversions to weapon programs.)12  
In making China’s first address to the IAEA conference in September 1984, the
PRC Minister of Nuclear Industry said that “China will, in exporting its nuclear
materials and equipment, request the recipient countries to accept safeguards in line
with the principles established in the agency’s statutes.  In the same view, when
importing nuclear materials and equipment, China will also make sure that they are
used for peaceful purposes.”  China did not offer to place its civilian nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards, the only nuclear weapon state that remained outside such
arrangements.13  Also, Administration officials were able to point to a statement
issued in January 1984 by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang when he visited the United
States and said that “we do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we
help other countries develop nuclear weapons.”14  That promise left a question about
any future activities.  Later, on January 19, 1985, PRC Vice Premier Li Peng issued
an additional nonproliferation pledge, saying that the PRC “does not and will not in
the future help any non-nuclear states to develop nuclear weapons” and that China
would abide by commitments to the IAEA.15  Still, questions remained about whether
there would be written pledges and whether any such assurances would be publicly
issued by China, itself, rather than the United States expressing its interpretation of
an understanding reached with China either verbally or in writing.
Senate Passes Restrictions
Senator John Glenn introduced an amendment to the FY1986 continuing
appropriations resolution (H.J.Res. 465) to prohibit the availability of funds for the
transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology to China until the President
certifies to Congress that the standards and methods of verifying peaceful use of U.S.
nuclear exports will be equivalent to those applied by the IAEA.  On December 9,
CRS-6
16 Archived CRS Issue Brief IB86050, Implementation of the U.S.-Chinese Agreement for
Nuclear Cooperation, by Warren Donnelly, September 28, 1989.
17 Joanne Omang, “U.S.-China Nuclear Pact Near,” Washington Post, July 22, 1985.
1984, the Senate adopted the amendment (by voice vote), but it was dropped in the
conference committee.16 
Reagan Submits Agreement in 1985
Although the agreement was initialed during Reagan’s visit to China in April
1984, the President did not submit it to Congress until July 1985, apparently timed
for a visit by PRC President Li Xiannian, who arrived in Washington, D.C., on July
22, 1985, and was to be treated to a state dinner at the White House.  Prior to this
visit, Administration officials briefed Congress and the press about supposed new
written assurances from China about nuclear nonproliferation.  Members included
Senator Alan Cranston who had reported in May 1984 that PRC nuclear technicians
were in Pakistan at a suspected nuclear weapon facility.  The Administration,
however, did not release the written assurance and said that the language of the
agreement remained largely the same.17  Secretary of Energy John Herrington  and
Li Peng signed the agreement on July 23, 1985.
Administration’s Concerns.  Although President Reagan’s top officials
approved the agreement, there were acknowledgments of problems in the agreement
as well as disagreements within the Administration.  Kenneth Adelman, Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), wrote in his memorandum for
the President that “the proposed Agreement meets all the applicable requirements of
the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act  and its entry into
force will substantially benefit U.S. non-proliferation objectives.”  
Nonetheless, Adelman first acknowledged that
the subject agreement is unique among agreements for peaceful nuclear
cooperation concluded since the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.  It is the
first such agreement with a nuclear-weapon state; and it is with a country that has
not, until recently, supported non-proliferation measures.  Although the
agreement was initialed in April 1984, we needed to clarify certain matters
related to implementation of China’s nuclear policies.  Those discussions
concluded successfully last month.  A major threat to our non-proliferation
objectives is the potential for “maverick” suppliers to undercut the safeguards
and other controls established through international cooperation and consensus.
In the past, China’s policies were a cause for concern because it neither adhered
to that consensus nor accepted other non-proliferation norms.” [emphasis added]
Adelman also noted that “a few of the major provisions in the agreement were
subject to long and difficult negotiations.  We have had detailed discussions on what
it means in practice not to assist other countries to acquire nuclear explosives. ...  We
understand that China’s policy will be implemented in a manner consistent with
those basic non-proliferation practices common to the United States and other major
suppliers. ...  The United States sought China’s acceptance of IAEA safeguards on
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(continued...)
U.S. supply under the agreement, but they adamantly refused to accept that
condition.” [emphasis added]
Finally, Adelman argued that the agreement for U.S. exports provided for
“mutually acceptable arrangements,” in the future, “to be established prior to
approval of U.S. exports” that “will include exchanges of information and visits by
U.S. Government personnel to relevant sites in China where material or equipment
subject to the agreement will be stored or used.”  He also contended that
“reprocessing of U.S. origin material cannot take place without U.S. consent.”  He
concluded that “it will be important to ensure that the specific arrangements provide
adequate confidence that any material or equipment subject to the agreement will be
used only for purposes consistent with the agreement.”18 [emphasis added]
Adelman also submitted ACDA’s “Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement” that detailed the Reagan Administration’s justification for the agreement
with China, pursuant to Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act.19  ACDA reached
“a favorable net assessment of the adequacy of the provisions of the proposed
agreement to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to
further any military or nuclear explosive purpose.”  It also concluded that execution
of the proposed agreement “would advance the non-proliferation program, policy,
and objectives of the United States.”
Proliferation Concerns.  In contrast, Thomas Roberts, Acting Chairman of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), wrote a memorandum to President
Reagan that offered a different assessment.  He referred to reviewing not only the
State Department’s proposed agreement but also an accompanying “Agreed Minute.”
He wrote that he agreed with the State Department that the agreement met the legal
requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act.  However, Roberts wrote of concerns about “the adequacy of
certain assurances provided by the PRC.”  He wrote that,
We also note that, although we believe the requirements of Section 123 are
satisfied, we would have preferred that the agreement contain a clear statement
of U.S. consent rights for the subsequent reprocessing or enrichment of U.S.-
supplied nuclear reactor fuel or fuel used in U.S.-supplied reactors.  Such a
statement would eliminate the potential for future misunderstandings.
Our final observation is that the Agreement contains a provision which would
expressly qualify the authority of the Congress to enact subsequent legislation
affecting the activities covered by the Agreement.  Previous agreements for
cooperation with other countries have not contained such a provision.  The
provision could reduce the flexibility of the United States in the future.20
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Formal Submission.  On July 24, 1985, President Reagan submitted to
Congress the “Agreement Between the United States and the People’s Republic of
China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” pursuant to Sections 123(b)
and 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.  In his transmittal
message, Reagan did not refer to the NRC’s concerns (in a then-classified
memorandum).  He noted that the proposed agreement was the first peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement with a Communist country and the only such agreement with
another nuclear-weapon state (because cooperation with the United Kingdom and
France was covered by U.S. agreements with the European Atomic Energy
Community, or EURATOM).  
The President first cited China’s “ambitious plans” for a “substantial number of
nuclear power stations.”  He pointed to China’s steps to “clarify” its non-proliferation
and nuclear export policies, including Premier Zhao’s statement, but Reagan did not
mention PRC practices.  He referred to bilateral “talks” rather than statements or
agreements and said that “we can expect” that China’s policy of not assisting a non-
nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear explosives will be implemented in a manner
consistent with the basic non-proliferation practices common to the United States and
other suppliers.  As benefits for U.S. interests, the President wrote that the agreement
would “have a significant, positive impact on overall U.S.-China relations;” “provide
the United States and its companies an opportunity to participate in another aspect
of China’s energy programs, with possible substantial economic benefit;” and
“further the non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States.”
Reagan argued that the agreement would not constitute an “unreasonable risk” to
common defense and security.  He noted that he was submitting the agreement to
Congress “without exempting it from any requirement” in section 123(a) of the
Atomic Energy Act.21
Issues for Congressional Review
The agreement’s submission began the periods of congressional review: 30 days
of continuous session under Section 123(b) to be followed by 60 days of continuous
session under Section 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act.  Chaired by Representative
Dante Fascell, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on July 31, 1985.
Secretary of Energy John Herrington, ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman,
Ambassador for Non-proliferation Richard Kennedy, and Assistant Secretary of State
Paul Wolfowitz testified.  Members debated a number of issues, raised in particular
by Representative Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
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Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, who testified and submitted his
legal analysis of the proposed agreement.22
Safeguards and Prior Approvals:  Representative Markey raised objections
about the agreement, saying that it contained the same “lax terms” as the draft that
was initialed in 1984: objections based on a lack of guaranty that safeguards will be
maintained for U.S. nuclear materials and equipment to ensure peaceful use; lack of
a guaranty of prior approval by the United States of any reprocessing, enrichment, or
alteration of nuclear material; and concerns about China’s nuclear exports and
technical assistance with other countries.  He asserted that,
Instead of obtaining a tightening of the language of the agreement, the
Administration reportedly has spent the last year providing itself with classified
assurances that the shadowy Chinese technicians purportedly working at
Pakistan’s renegade Kahuta uranium enrichment plant have disappeared, and that
China is no longer exporting unsafeguarded supplies of heavy water and low-
enriched uranium to other threshold nuclear-weapon states such as Argentina and
South Africa.  It is not enough that the Administration satisfy itself on this
count.23
Unilateral Understanding of Verbal Assurances:  Representative Markey also
contended that the assurances from China were actually assurances in a secret
memorandum or “Non-Paper” of the State Department.  In his written statement, he
reported that “Ambassador Kennedy reportedly resorted to the device of writing
down his own (classified) understanding of China’s new improved nonproliferation
policy.  While declining to sign this ingenious document, responsible Chinese
officials reportedly nodded their assent, and Kennedy raced back to Washington to
report this triumph of diplomacy to the President.” 
Ambassador Kennedy testified that the Chinese “understood” U.S. legal
requirements, “said” they had no “plans” to undertake activities in question, and were
concerned about whether the United States would give a timely response.  Kennedy
also testified that the Chinese made it “clear” that when they “say” that they will not
assist other countries to develop nuclear weapons, “this also applies to all nuclear
explosives,” acknowledging that it was in question.24  (During a meeting of the
committee to mark-up legislation in November 1985, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State James Devine confirmed Representative Dan Burton’s assertion of confidential
summaries of discussions that were not in writing.  Devine said that the PRC
“assured us orally that they would ... require safeguards on their own exports.”)
Legal Compliance:  Representative Markey further testified that the proposed
agreement did not reconcile with all the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, and
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so the President should re-submit the agreement with exemption from the criteria for
safeguards and prior consent, as stipulated in the “Proxmire Amendment” to the
Export Administration Act that amended the Atomic Energy Act.
Congressional Procedure:  In his legal memo, Representative Markey wrote
that the agreement did not satisfy the requirements of Section 123a(1) and 123a(7),
(on safeguards and prior approval).25  (Section 123d provides further that “an
agreement for cooperation exempted by the President pursuant to subsection a. from
any requirement contained in that subsection shall not become effective unless the
Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating that the Congress
does favor such agreement.”)  Representative Markey advised that, after asking the
President to re-submit the agreement with an exemption from the “strict terms” of
those sections, “the Congress would then be in a position to make an affirmative
decision as to whether the benefits of this particular agreement outweigh the damages
which would flow from deviating from United States’ long-term non-proliferation
policy.”
China as a Nuclear Power: In the hearing, Representative William Broomfield
pointed out that China was already a nuclear weapon state.  Representative Markey
later noted that the agreement stated that transferred material, facilities, or
components, and material used in or produced through the use of the supplies “shall
not be used for any nuclear explosive device, or research specifically on or
development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose,” but did
not provide for safeguards to ensure this intent. 
Proliferation Risk:  As for the risk of nuclear proliferation to other countries,
Representative Markey urged his colleagues at the hearing to obtain Top Secret
classified briefings from the NRC and the Central Intelligence Agency in order to
understand “some unresolved questions that the NRC and others have with respect
to the retransfer of nuclear materials and technology.”  He referred to a suspected
temporary suspension in China’s cooperation with Pakistan’s nuclear program to
coincide with the proposed agreement.
Progress in Non-proliferation Policy:  Representative Henry Hyde said that
“the notion of consultations which are provided by Article 8 does provide the right
to visit and to exchange — not simply talk.”  He argued that, “getting a closed society
to open up and allow us this opportunity to visit and exchange, and the potential to
influence their policy, seems to me a move forward.”  Representative Benjamin
Gilman also asked, “hasn’t negotiation of this agreement served our nonproliferation
interests by helping China adopt a more supportive approach to nonproliferation?”
Non-Proliferation Standards:  Representative Stephen Solarz asked, “even in
a worse case scenario where [the Chinese] reneged on their commitments or it turns
out that their understanding of the commitments differed from ourselves and they
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utilize some of the technology we transferred for the purpose of helping other
countries develop nuclear weapons, could they not have done that anyway even
without this agreement?  If so, what do we lose by approving this agreement when
potentially it might work in bringing them into the nonproliferation regimes which
so far at least they have resisted in terms of full scope safeguards and other things?”
In turn, Representative Markey asked, “if we decline to establish by both law and
practice a clear, objective standard, ... on what basis then do we turn to the Pakistanis
or to the South Africans or to the Indians or to the Libyans or anyone else in the
world and say there is still an objective standard for nuclear restraint?”  He argued
that “we have to decide whether we want a nonproliferation policy or a policy of
selective proliferation.”
Exception for China:  Representative Markey differed with the Administration
on whether China should be treated as an exception concerning the question of
safeguards, stating that “we insisted that the United Kingdom, a weapons state and
our closest ally, accept [safeguards] as part of our nuclear cooperation agreement.
So why not the Chinese?”  He said that “under the provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act, the People’s Republic, as a nuclear weapons state, is exempted from the IAEA
safeguards requirement.  However, contrary to the agreement’s erroneous
implication, China is not altogether exempted from safeguards requirements.”
Precluding Application of Laws:  Representative Lawrence Smith raised the
question of whether the agreement “waives the appropriate provisions of American
law and makes only the agreement the underlying document on which a violation
could be claimed.”  Representative Markey agreed that committing the United States
to the nuclear cooperation agreement with China would provide the sole operative
language for determining violations and nuclear transfers.  Referring to the precedent
of congressional debate in 1980 about whether the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978 applied retroactively to an agreement for uranium exports to India,
Representative Markey asserted that “this agreement ensures that no subsequent
language by the United States Congress affects the activities covered by the
agreement.”
Prejudice:  Representative Markey objected to the lack of a guaranty of U.S.
prior approval for any reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear materials by China,
along with language to consider the activities “favorably.”
Precedent:  Representative Markey also asked “what the future holds if this
vague, elastic, and unverifiable framework of cooperation becomes the standard for
nuclear negotiations with other countries?”
Necessity for Diplomacy and Trade:  Representative Ted Weiss said, “I think
Members of the Congress fully appreciate the importance of cooperation
diplomatically and strategically with the People’s Republic of China, as well as
increased trade relations with the PRC, but I don’t think that necessarily requires us
to forego the requirements of law adopted by us after very careful consideration.”
Unresolved Disputes and Credibility:  Representative Dan Burton raised the
issue of China’s unresolved dispute with and threats to use force against Taiwan.  He
also raised the question of whether China could be trusted to enter into an agreement.
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Other Hearings
Besides the hearing held by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 31, 1985,
other hearings were held by the:
! House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on U.S.-Pacific Rim
Trade, on September 12, 1985
! House Foreign Affairs Committee, closed hearing, on October 3,
1985
! Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 9, 1985.26
Legislation and P.L. 99-183
Concerning legislation, Congress had the options of: requesting the President
to re-submit the agreement; passing a resolution to disapprove the proposed
agreement; passing a resolution to approve it; or passing a resolution to approve it
with conditions.
H.Res. 269.  On September 20, 1985, Representative Markey introduced H.Res.
269 to request the President to re-submit the proposed agreement with exemptions
from Sections 123a(1) and 123a(7) of the Atomic Energy Act.
H.R. 3537.  On October 9, 1985, Representative Edward Feighan introduced
H.R. 3537 to ensure adequate verification of peaceful uses of nuclear exports to the
PRC (modeled on IAEA safeguards).  The Administration opposed the bill.27
S. 1754.  Also on October 9, 1985, Senator John Glenn introduced S. 1754 to
ensure adequate verification of peaceful uses of nuclear exports to the PRC (modeled
on IAEA safeguards).  The Administration also opposed this bill.  Senator Dave
Durenberger, Chairman of the Committee on Intelligence, supported the bill.  In a
floor speech on October 21, 1985, Senator Alan Cranston reported questions about
China’s assistance for Iran’s nuclear program.  Senators Richard Lugar and Jesse
Helms reportedly supported the Administration.28
H.J.Res. 404.  On October 1, 1985, Representative Fascell introduced by
request H.J.Res. 404, a joint resolution to approve the proposed agreement.  On
November 13, 1985, the House Foreign Affairs Committee met to mark up the
resolution.  Representative Don Bonker offered an amendment, favoring the
agreement with conditions.  The language added requirements for a Presidential
certification before the issuance of export licenses or approval of retransfers and a
waiting period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress.  The President was to
certify that: (1) the verification was designed effectively to ensure the peaceful use
of U.S. exports; (2) China provided additional details about its nuclear non-
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proliferation policies and all information was in conformity with Section 129 of the
Atomic Energy Act (prohibiting nuclear exports to any country that engaged in
nuclear proliferation); and (3) the obligation to consider activities favorably shall not
prejudice U.S. decision-making.  The amendment also declared that each proposed
export would be subject to U.S. laws and regulations in effect at the time of each
export.  The language also called for a Presidential report detailing in unclassified
form the PRC’s past and current non-proliferation policies as well as practices.
Finally, the amendment stated that the agreement with China would not provide a
precedent for negotiating other agreements.
Representative Howard Wolpe objected to the language as a unilateral attempt
to address the agreement’s “deficiencies” with U.S. interpretations.  Representative
Solarz defended the language, which the Administration accepted, because China
already possessed nuclear weapon capability and would have “additional incentives”
to refrain from nuclear proliferation.  The committee adopted the amendment by
voice vote.  The committee’s report on the bill, H.Rept. 99-382, noted that while U.S.
nuclear cooperation with the PRC will in no way further its ability to use nuclear
energy for military or explosive uses, the committee “has long been concerned by
reports of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program.”  On
November 20, 1985, the Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.J.Res. 404 (H.Rept.
99-382).  The House subsequently passed S.J.Res. 238 in lieu.
S.J.Res. 238 (P.L. 99-183).  Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee passed a resolution identical to that of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
S.J.Res. 238, the Joint Resolution Relating to the Approval and Implementation of
the Proposed Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China.  The Senate passed (by voice vote) S.J.Res. 238 on
November 21, 1985.  The House then passed it (307-112) on December 11, 1985.
President Reagan signed it on December 16, 1985 (as P.L. 99-183).  The agreement
took effect on December 30, 1985.29 
In his statement upon signing the bill, the President noted that he was required
to submit a one-time certification and a one-time report, with the decision about
certification assigned “exclusively to the President.”30  However, President Reagan
did not issue the certification.  
Sanctions After the Tiananmen Crackdown
Initial Legislation
On June 4, 1989, Deng Xiaoping and other PRC leaders used the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to brutally suppress demonstrators in Beijing (commonly
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called the Tiananmen Crackdown in reference to the square that was the focal point
of nationwide protests).  As part of the U.S. response, on June 21, 1989,
Representative Markey sought to limit nuclear cooperation with the PRC  by
introducing language to H.R. 2655, to amend the Foreign Assistance Act.  The
language sought to ban the issuance of export licenses and nuclear cooperation unless
the President:  (1) has made certifications and submitted the report required by P.L.
99-183; (2) has certified to Congress that the PRC government ended martial law and
that the human rights situation has “significantly improved;” and (3) has certified to
Congress that the PRC government has provided the United States with a “written
declaration that it is not directly or indirectly assisting any nation in testing,
developing, or acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the materials and components
for such devices.”31  On June 29, Representative Dante Fascell introduced sanctions
on China in an en bloc amendment (H.Amdt. 107) to H.R. 2655, which passed the
House by 418-0.  H.R. 2655 was passed in the House but not the Senate.  
In the Senate, on July 14, 1989, Senators George Mitchell and Robert Dole
introduced an amendment (S.Amdt. 271) to S. 1160, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FY1990, seeking to impose additional sanctions against the
PRC.  Those sanctions included the limitation of nuclear cooperation.  The Senate
passed the amendment by 81-10.  On July 21, the Senate incorporated the bill in the
House version (H.R. 1487) and passed it in lieu of S. 1160.
P.L. 101-246
In the end, Congress legislated comprehensive sanctions in response to the
Tiananmen Crackdown in H.R. 3792, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FYs 1990 and 1991 (introduced on November 21, 1989 and enacted as P.L. 101-246
on February 16, 1990).  Section 902(a)(6) of P.L. 101-246 suspended nuclear
cooperation with China until the President: (1) certifies to Congress that the PRC
“has provided clear and unequivocal assurances to the United States that it is not
assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear weapon state, either directly or
indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the materials and components
for such devices;” (2) makes the certifications and submits the report required by P.L.
99-183; and (3) makes a report under subsection (b)(1) or (2), reporting that the PRC
government has made progress in political reforms or that it is “in the national
interest” of the United States to terminate a suspension or disapproval.
Implementation of the Agreement
Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush did not issue the certifications to
implement the agreement.  After the deterioration in bilateral ties after the Tiananmen
Crackdown of 1989, the relationship with China again deteriorated in the Taiwan
Strait Crisis of 1995-1996.  President Clinton dramatically underscored U.S. interests
in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question by deploying two aircraft carrier
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battle groups near Taiwan in March 1996.  Questions persisted about U.S. sanctions
for PRC nuclear proliferation activities in Pakistan and Iran.32  President Clinton’s
1998 certification to Congress conceded that “the United States [had] decided not to
proceed with implementation of the 1985 nuclear cooperation agreement because of
continuing questions about contacts between Chinese entities and elements
associated with the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.”  He also noted that “nuclear
cooperation between China and Iran dates from June 1985.”33
Congressional Action Before Certification
By the spring of 1997, Washington and Beijing discussed efforts to improve
ties, including the first formal U.S.-PRC summit in the United States in 12 years.
Those discussions included China’s request for implementation of the agreement.
The Clinton Administration considered a Presidential certification for
implementation as the “centerpiece” of a state visit by PRC ruler Jiang Zemin to
Washington, D.C., in October 1997.  (Jiang was the Communist Party General-
Secretary, Central Military Commission Chairman, and PRC President.)  
In Congress, Representatives Markey and Solomon led a total of 62 Members
to write a letter to President Clinton in July 1997, urging him not to certify.34
Chaired by Representative Benjamin Gilman, the House International Relations
Committee held a hearing on the agreement on October 7, 1997.35  In the Senate, the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, chaired by Senator Frank Murkowski,
held a hearing on October 23, 1997.36  On November 5, 1997, the House passed (by
393-29) an amendment sponsored by Representative Gilman to extend congressional
review for implementation of the agreement from 30 to 120 days and provide for
expedited review procedures.  The language amended H.R. 2358, the Political
Freedom in China Act of 1997, which passed the House on November 5, 1997.
Meanwhile, U.S. firms, such as Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Asea Brown
Boveri (ABB), Bechtel Power Corporation, and Stone and Webster Engineering,
lobbied Congress to allow them to bid in a market worth as much as $50 billion.37
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U.S.-PRC Summit in October 1997
On the eve of the summit in October 1997, the PRC advanced its nuclear non-
proliferation policy by joining the Zangger Committee (the NPT’s Exporters’
Committee) on October 16 and promising not to begin new nuclear projects in Iran
(in a secret letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright).38  At the summit on
October 29, 1997, President Clinton did not issue the certifications to implement the
agreement, but the White House announced that “subject to case-by-case licensing
and on-going U.S. monitoring, President Clinton will take action to enable U.S.
companies to compete in China’s nuclear power market.”  According to President
Clinton, the agreement would serve U.S. national security, environmental, and
economic interests, saying that “the United States and China share a strong interest
in stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other sophisticated
weaponry in unstable regions and rogue states — notably, Iran.”  The President also
said that he welcomed the steps China took and the “clear assurances” it gave that
day to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology and
that “on the basis of these steps and assurances,” he agreed to move ahead with the
nuclear cooperation agreement.39 On October 30, 1997, the State Department
announced that “the U.S. and China have agreed to a memorandum of understanding
on arrangements for visits and exchanges of information” and asserted that “this
memorandum of understanding will permit us to monitor sales and uses of
equipment.”40  
Governmental Cooperation
On October 29, 1997, at the summit in Washington, the U.S. Department of
Energy and the PRC State Planning Commission signed an “Agreement of Intent on
Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology.”  They intended to
exchange technical information and promote cooperation (including joint research
and development projects); to enter into an agreement for nuclear-related
cooperation; to invite relevant entities to participate in projects; and to engage in
cooperation that may include exchanges of technical information, personnel, samples,
materials, equipment; training, use of facilities, and other forms of cooperation.41
Later, at a summit in Beijing in June 1998, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the
PRC State Planning Commission signed an Agreement on Cooperation Concerning
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technologies, including bringing PRC scientists to U.S.
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national laboratories, universities, and nuclear reactor facilities.42  In Beijing, starting
on October 24, 2005, DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and
the China Atomic Energy Authority held a week-long Integrated Nuclear Material
Management Technology Demonstration on security at civilian nuclear facilities.43
Clinton Certifies Agreement in 1998
On January 12, 1998, President Clinton signed certifications (as required by P.L.
99-183) on China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy and practices to implement the
1985 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.  The President also issued the certification
and waived a sanction imposed after the Tiananmen Crackdown (in P.L. 101-246).
President Clinton submitted his certifications to Congress, contending that “the
Agreement will have a significant, positive impact in promoting U.S.
nonproliferation and national security interests with China and in building a stronger
bilateral relationship with China based on respect for international norms.”44  
Under Section 902(b)(2) of P.L. 101-246 (waiver authority), President Clinton
reported that it was in the “national interest” to terminate the suspension of nuclear
cooperation:
! “it is in the U.S. national interest to consolidate and build on the
progress China has made in the nonproliferation area, and the
implementation of the Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S.
and the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Peaceful Uses
of Nuclear Energy will establish a promising framework for doing
so;”
! “it is also in the U.S. national interest to build stronger, mutually
advantageous bilateral relations with China based on respect for
international norms;”
! “the United States also has an economic national interest ... The
Agreement will enable U.S. companies to compete for contracts in
the world’s fastest growing nuclear energy market.”
In making his certification, Clinton submitted to Congress:
! Presidential Determination No. 98-10 (Memorandum for the
Secretary of State, “Certification Pursuant to Section (b)(1) of Public
Law 99-183 and to Section 902 (a)(6)(B) of Public Law 101-246”)
dated January 12, 1998
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! Unclassified Report on the PRC’s Nonproliferation Policies,
Practices, and Assurances Required by P.L. 99-103
! U.S.-PRC Memorandum of Understanding on Exchanges of
Information and Visits (initialed on June 23, 1987) and Side Notes
on Protection of Business Confidential Information (signed on
October 22, 1997)
! Basis for certification under Section (b)(1)(A) of P.L. 99-183
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Congressional Review
During debate on the agreement, some in Congress, the nonproliferation
community, and elsewhere were skeptical that PRC nonproliferation policies and
practices had changed sufficiently to warrant the certifications and that they served
U.S. interests.  They also pointed out that China had not joined the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, which required full-scope safeguards.  The House International Relations
Committee held a hearing on February 4, 1998, in which Robert Einhorn, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, testified for the Clinton
Administration.45
Congressional review ended on March 18, 1998, with no legislation to block the
agreement’s implementation, and it has since been implemented.  U.S. firms may
apply for Export-Import Bank financing and licenses from the NRC and DOE for
nuclear exports to China, and foreign firms may apply to re-export U.S. technology.
On March 19, 1998, 13 Members in the House led by Representative Markey
wrote to President Clinton to urge him to terminate implementation of the agreement.
Also, as amended by Representative Gilman, Section 1523 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY1999 (P.L. 105-261), enacted on October 17, 1998, requires
the President to notify Congress “upon” granting licenses by the NRC for nuclear
exports or re-exports to a non-NATO country that has detonated a nuclear explosive
device (e.g., China).  As required, the State Department, on June 9, 2000, issued the
first notification to Congress that the NRC issued a license on February 3, 2000, for
the export of tantalite ore to China.  
Incomplete Assurances
Visits.  President Clinton had submitted his certification with a Memorandum
of Understanding (pursuant to Article 8 of the agreement) that was initialed in
Washington, DC, on June 23, 1987, but not signed.  (Concerning “consultations,”
Article 8(2) of the agreement stated that the cooperation would be between two
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nuclear-weapon states and that bilateral safeguards “are not required.”  It called for
“diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges
of information and visits to material, facilities, and components.)  The Memorandum
called for annual visits to reactors.  In the event of discrepancies, it called for the
parties to “consult” to make “mutually acceptable” arrangements for the addition or
reduction of visits, in place of safeguards.  The President contended that this initialed
Memorandum provided for arrangements that met the certification standard of P.L.
99-183 that the arrangements were designed to be effective in ensuring peaceful uses
of nuclear material, facilities, or components.  In February 1998, the Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation of the Department of Energy published the “Proposed
Subsequent Arrangement Concerning Reciprocal Arrangements for Exchanges of
Information and Visits Under the Agreement for Cooperation for Peaceful uses of
Nuclear Energy” between the United States and the PRC, noting that it sought to sign
the initialed Memorandum which provided the “framework” for arrangements.46  The
United States and the PRC signed the Memorandum of Understanding on May 6,
1998,  and DOE published it.47
Re-transfers.  Given the PRC’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan that raised
questions of U.S. sanctions,48 the Clinton Administration apparently did not have
adequate assurances from the PRC that it would not re-transfer and divert U.S.
nuclear technology to another country, potentially for military use.  The
Administration continued negotiations with China on this issue, after the agreement’s
implementation.49  According to a reported NRC memorandum of April 4, 2000,
DOE officials had held up 16 applications for licenses to export U.S. technology
since 1998, due to disagreement about assurances, including a U.S. demand for a
blanket assurance and a PRC offer of case-by-case assurances.50  Those cases were
called “Part 810 cases” in reference to the DOE’s export controls that are regulated
by Part 810 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
On September 16, 2003, in Vienna, Austria, Secretary of Energy Spencer
Abraham and the chairman of China’s Atomic Energy Authority apparently agreed
to assurances from China that U.S. nuclear technology would not be re-transferred
by China to third parties without prior U.S. consent.  The understanding, however,
was reached in an exchange of diplomatic notes to “establish a process for
determining what nuclear technologies require government-to-government
nonproliferation assurances and set forth procedures for exchanging the assurances.”
Afterwards, the Bush Administration continued to seek assurances to prevent
unauthorized re-transfers by China.51
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In September 2004, the State Department publicly stated that the exchange of
diplomatic notes in September 2003 followed as a “second significant event” the
1998 implementation of the agreement, which permitted transfers of nuclear reactor
fuel and components “based on case-by-case review.” Then, the diplomatic notes
“confirmed conditions and assurances governing transfers of nuclear technology
which are not covered by the agreement, and those notes provided as well for a case-
by-case review.”  The NRC issued licences for export of nuclear reactor components
under the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, while the DOE authorized transfers of
nuclear technology to China for its civilian nuclear power program based on the
PRC’s “written nonproliferation assurances.”52
U.S. Nuclear Exports53
On February 28, 2005, Westinghouse Electric Company — based near
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and owned by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. — submitted a
bid for a PRC contract to supply four commercial nuclear reactors.  Westinghouse
submitted the bid jointly with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Japan.54  Competing
against the Westinghouse-Mitsubishi consortium are Areva of France and
Atomstroyexport of Russia.55  All three bids are reported to be strongly backed by
their respective governments.56
Two of the planned Chinese reactors would be built for the China Guangdong
Nuclear Power Company at a site near Yangjiang, and the other two would be built
at a site near Sanmen for the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), according
to media reports.57
An article posted on Human Events Online, in criticizing the tentative Ex-Im
Bank support for the deal, focused on CNNC’s alleged role in transferring nuclear
weapons technology to Pakistan and Iran.  By subsidizing the cost of Westinghouse
reactors, the article contended, the U.S. government would be “inviting charges of
hypocrisy by dealing with known proliferators” and undermining U.S. diplomacy
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with the Chinese Communist regime.  The article further argued that the deal would
be inconsistent with U.S. opposition to Russia’s sale of reactor technology to Iran.58
The reactors that Westinghouse proposes to sell to China are a new design
called the AP-1000, which has never been constructed.  However, the AP-1000
received final design approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on
September 13, 2004, and is now awaiting NRC certification as a standard plant that
could be built in the United States without further design review.
The 1,100-megawatt AP-1000 is an improved version of existing Westinghouse
commercial nuclear power plants. Westinghouse pressurized water reactors use
“light” (ordinary) water to help sustain the chain reaction in the reactor core and to
carry away the resulting heat.  The heated water circulates under pressure in a closed
loop through heat exchangers that make steam to drive electric generators.  This basic
Westinghouse pressurized water technology is dominant in the U.S. nuclear power
industry and, through licensing arrangements, in most of the world.
Technological benefits that China might gain from purchasing the Westinghouse
reactor as opposed to its French competitor are likely to be modest.  China already
has four operating commercial reactors supplied by Areva, using updated versions
of French reactors originally built under a now-expired Westinghouse license.  In the
competition for the latest Chinese contract, both Westinghouse and Areva contend
that they are offering the most advanced designs available.
There would be no direct effect of the proposed Westinghouse reactor sale on
China’s nuclear weapons program.  China has been a nuclear weapons state since
1964 and already has reactors designed for producing weapons materials.  Light
water reactors (such as the Westinghouse  and Areva designs) are poorly suited for
weapons production.  In contrast to the Chinese situation, the United States opposes
Russia’s light water reactor construction in Iran because Iran is not currently a
nuclear weapons state and appears to be using its nuclear power program as a pretext
for developing other nuclear fuel cycle facilities that could be used to make weapons.
Indirect benefits that the Westinghouse contract might provide to CNNC’s
weapons activities and to the Chinese government’s ability to resist U.S. diplomatic
pressure are inherently difficult to assess.  A staff member for Senate Banking
Committee Chairman Richard Shelby was quoted as saying, “There is an inevitable
tension that exists between the desire to support U.S. commercial interests abroad on
the one hand and the requirement to ensure national security is not endangered
through the advancement of those commercial interests.”59
Westinghouse’s commercial interest in the Chinese contract are considerable.
The project would give the company the opportunity to build a working model of the
AP-1000 design and gain a foothold in the potentially large Chinese nuclear power
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market.  Although no new commercial nuclear power plants have been ordered in the
United States since 1978, several U.S. utilities are now studying the feasibility of
new reactors, and the successful construction of the AP-1000 design in China could
be an important factor in their decisions.  Nuclear power incentives included in the
recently enacted Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) have further increased
interest in renewed U.S. reactor construction.
Because the Chinese contract envisions a series of four reactors, Westinghouse
could also cover some of its “first of a kind” engineering (FOAKE) costs for the AP-
1000 and gain some production economies, which could help reduce the price for
future buyers.  Some FOAKE costs for the AP-1000 are also expected to be paid by
the Department of Energy’s “Nuclear Power 2010” program.  Westinghouse and
other nuclear suppliers have long contended that new nuclear power plants could be
competitive if a sufficient number of identical reactors were built in a series.
If Westinghouse wins the Chinese reactor contract, Congress will have an
opportunity to review any proposed Ex-Im Bank financial assistance before final
approval by the Bank’s Board of Directors.  For any proposed nuclear-related
assistance of $100 million or more, the Bank must notify Congress at least 25 days
of continuous session or 35 calendar days before final approval (12 U.S.C.
635(b)(3)).
The congressional notification procedure was used in 1994, for example, when
the Ex-Im Bank proposed to guarantee $300 million in loans for Westinghouse to
upgrade a reactor in the Czech Republic.  Although the controversial project drew a
number of comments and questions from individual members of Congress, there was
no move by Congress as a whole to block the loan guarantees, and they were
approved by the Ex-Im Bank Board of Directors after the review period ended.60
